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Abstract 
A method is developed to combine techniques of 
reliability and safety analysis with the Modelica lan-
guage, which is now widely used for the modelling 
and simulation of technical systems. 
The method allows to perform a reliability or safety 
analysis on the system model that is created and used 
for simulation studies. The procedure automatically 
determines the so called minimal path sets or mini-
mal cut sets of a system, its failure probability and 
critical components. 
The reliability and safety analysis methods are in-
corporated in a Modelica library that is established 
for the modelling and simulation of aircraft on-board 
electrical power systems. The recent trend towards a 
broader use of electric system technologies on com-
mercial aircraft has motivated the creation of this 
kind of model library, which supports the conceptual 
design and optimisation of on-board electrical sys-
tems regarding power behaviour, weight, reliability 
and safety. 
Keywords: reliability; safety; fault modelling; re-
dundant system; minimal path sets; minimal cut sets 
 
1 Introduction 
Much of the information needed for reliability or 
safety analysis is contained already in complex sys-
tem models that are usually built in Modelica. The 
specific modelling additions needed, as well as the 
concept of an automated reliability and safety analy-
sis procedure are described in this paper. 
The analysis procedures evaluate the physical behav-
iour of a system model in multiple simulations. Rep-
resenting not only the normal but also the faulty be-
haviour of components is needed as an addition to 
the modelling, as described in section 2.1. Section 
2.5 illustrates the scope and method of the reliability 
and safety analyses and their relevance regarding 
aircraft on-board systems. A way of minimising the 
involved computational effort is outlined in 2.5.4. 
Then, section 3.1 presents an example model of an 
electric power system of a recent large commercial 
aircraft. Subsequently, a safety and reliability analy-
sis are conducted on the model for example scenar-
ios, the results of which are graphically presented 
and discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
2 Modelling Approach and Outline 
of Reliability and Safety Analysis 
Method 
2.1 Component Fault Modelling 
A variety of object-oriented model libraries has been 
developed in the Modelica language, as generally 
known. Typically, each component model contains a 
description of the normal operational behaviour by 
differential and/or algebraic equations. 
For the purpose of reliability and safety analysis, the 
component models have to be enhanced to describe 
also the failure behaviour by physical equations. Ba-
sic examples are given hereafter by the model ap-
proach taken for some common electric components. 
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Figure 1: Modelica model of an electrical cable with 
normal and failure behaviour 
 
A two-core electric cable can be described as an oh-
mic resistor. For the normal function of the cable, its 
resistance R is in the order of Rnom ≈ 10-1 Ω. An open 
circuit (O/C) failure of the cable is characterised by a 
very large resistance, e.g. 106 Ω, whereas a short cir-
cuit failure (S/C) can be desribed by small resistance 
of 10-5 Ω connecting the two cores of the electric 
cable. As can be seen in Figure 1, the resistor ele-
ment used to model the short circuit is always pre-
sent in the cable model, but it has a large value of 
106 Ω in cases other than a short circuit failure. 
 
 
Figure 2: Electric contactor model with normal and 
failure behaviour and current limitation function 
 
An electrical contactor is also modelled as a variable 
ohmic resistor, as shown in Figure 2. The opening 
and closing of the contactor is described by different 
resistance values, Ropen = 106 Ω for the open and ap-
proximately Rclosed = 210-3 Ω for the closed contactor 
state. The small resistance of the closed contactor 
effects a voltage drop, which can be specified by a 
model parameter. Optionally, this model may be 
used as a current limiting device, similar to a circuit 
breaker. Figure 3 shows the current limitation func-
tion: By increasing the resistance value Rlmt above 
zero, the limitation function prevents that the actual 
current, denoted by I, exceeds the nominal current 
Inom . This kind of model has been selected, since it 
does not require any resetting after the limitation 
function has been activated in the simulation, other 
than a real circuit breaker which must be reset after 
having tripped. For a contactor or circuit breaker, 
there are a couple of conceivable failure modes, and 
the two most relevant of them are described in the 
model: An open circuit failure, which is modelled in 
the same manner as for the electrical cable, and a 
fails to open malfunction. The latter failure mode 
means a loss of the current limitation function, i.e. 
failure to protect against overcurrent. 
As the examples suggest, a DC modelling approach 
has been selected for the electrical components. A 
single or three phase AC component is described by 
the equivalent DC component with root mean square 
values for voltage and current. A three phase AC 
component is respresented by a single phase, assum-
ing that the three phases are symmetrical. Thus, the 
substitute single phase generates, conducts or uses a 
third of the entire current and power. Furthermore, 
the electrical behaviour is described by algebraic 
physical equations for the normal and several failure 
modes of each component; differential equations are 
omitted for simplification. This is judged as adequate 
regarding the objective of performing network archi-
tecture level conceptual design and optimisation, 
including the analysis of steady-state electric power 
behaviour, reliability, safety and weight. 
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Figure 3: Current limitation function 
 
Each component model has a boolean input signal to 
control its status, i.e. normal operation, failure mode 
1, failure mode 2 etc., as applicable. The status can 
be shifted during simulation. The failure probability 
 is stored in each component model as 
a changeable parameter. Constant failure rates λi and 
exponentially distributed lifetimes are a common 
assumption in reliability and safety analysis. 
t
i
ie1p  λ
The weight of a component is given dependent on 
sizing parameters of the accordant component 
model, such as the weight of a generator depends on 
its nominal power and speed. 
Thus, a Modelica library of electric component mod-
els, that are augmented with a basic failure behaviour 
and parameterised weights, is developed. In doing 
so, the concept of creating component models that 
are usable regardless of the application or physical 
context, is being followed. Compatibility with exist-
ing model libraries is maintained. 
 
2.2 Concept of Model Library with Included 
Analysis Procedures 
The introduced Modelica library of electric compo-
nent models and accompanying procedures for 
automated electric loads, reliability and safety analy-
sis forms a tool for the conceptual design of aircraft 
on-board electric power systems. The tool is named 
as the Electrical Network Architecture Design Opti-
misation Tool - ENADOT. Besides reliability and 
safety, ENADOT is prepared to evaluate electric 
network architecture concepts w.r.t. to power behav-
iour and weight, as illustrated by Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Concept of a Modelica-based tool for electric 
network architecture design analysis and optimisation 
- ENADOT 
 
Large and complex models of electrical networks 
can be composed using the graphical editor of Dy-
mola in the known manner. 
Aircraft on-board electrical power systems are of 
particular interest w.r.t. reliability and safety, since 
they supply various loads, many of which fulfill a 
function that is essential for the safety of flight. Due 
to the recent trend to replace hydraulic and pneu-
matic supply systems by electric power on-board of 
commercial aircraft, the electric demands and thus 
the overall size of the electric system tend to grow. 
This increase of size and complexity also calls for a 
comprehensive modelling and simulation tool, due to 
the limitations of traditional design methods. 
 
2.3 Modelling of Electric System Operating 
Modes 
Electric power systems on-board of aircraft are typi-
cally split into several independent channels for re-
dundancy, each comprising an engine driven genera-
tor, a distribution network and a number of loads. If 
failures occur, the network is reconfigured automati-
cally to isolate the fault and to secure power supply 
to most of the loads, with priority to the essential 
ones. This reconfiguration capability has to be built 
into the system model accordingly. It is achieved by 
including the open / close logics of the various elec-
tric network contactors, which link (or cut off) the 
generators, busbars and loads. Thus, an electric net-
work architecture model can be simulated for a nor-
mal and various abnormal operating scenarios. 
2.4 Visualisation of System Operation and In-
teractive Checking 
The diagram layer of an electric network architecture 
model is used also for dynamic and graphic display 
of the open / closed states of the various contactors, 
as well as of the resulting flow of electric power by 
different colours. For this purpose, ENADOT em-
ploys the visualisation and real-time simulation ca-
pabilities of Dymola and Visual C++. 
If a component is energised, i.e. under voltage or 
conducting current, then its shape is coloured, as 
shown in Figures 5 and 6. The accordant colour 
stems from the generator or battery which energises 
the component. Passive components are shown in 
grey colour. The user can interactively shift the op-
erating / fault modes of the electric network compo-
nents, i.e. inject failures by mouse-click, and observe 
the resulting system behaviour by the visualisation in 
the diagram layer. That way, the model implementa-
tion of an electric network architecture is readily 
verified with regard to the intended behaviour. 
 
2.5 Automated Analysis Procedures 
To evaluate an electric network architecture model, 
ENADOT provides functions for an electric loads 
analysis, computation of component weights and 
overall system weight, a safety analysis which exam-
ines the probability of failure of voltage supply to a 
single or several busbars, a reliability analysis which 
evaluates the operational availability ( aircraft dis-
patch reliability) of an electric network architecture, 
as well as compilation of a bill of material. The elec-
tric loads and safety analyses rely on the capability 
of an electric network model to simulate various op-
erating modes and to bypass failed components. 
These procedures are written as Modelica functions 
in algorithm syntax. They are part of the ENADOT 
library and simply rely on Dymola for execution. 
2.5.1 Electrical Loads 
The electric loads analysis determines the highest 
electric power generated or carried by a component 
in the most adverse operating case. To compute the 
highest electric power (design point) of any compo-
nent of an electric network model, the function simu-
lates it automatically for normal and degraded oper-
ating scenarios. As a result, the design point is pro-
vided for each component combined with its tempo-
ral occurrence during a flight cycle. Then, the sizing 
parameters of each component are selected which in 
turn yields the component weights and the overall 
weight of an electric network architecture. 
2.5.2 Safety 
By means of a safety analysis function embedded in 
ENADOT, the probability of loss of voltage supply 
to a single or several busbars of the electric network 
can be computed. Analysing the probability of loss 
of voltage supply to busbar(s) is particularly relevant 
if electric loads are connected to them that perform a 
function which is critical regarding the safety of 
flight. The scenarios to be investigated have to be 
supplied by the operator, e.g. “system is functional if 
at least one DC busbar is energised” or “system has 
failed if voltage is lost on the AC essential busbar”. 
Before starting the self-acting safety analysis, the 
operator can choose between the block-diagram 
(RBD) or the fault tree analysis (FTA) method. 
The former is based on the identification of minimal 
path sets: A minimal path set is a combination of 
intact components that causes a system to be func-
tional in the sense of the specified scenario, e.g. “at 
least one DC busbar energised”. Minimal means that 
a path set contains only as many intact components 
as are necessary for the system to be functional. Re-
dundant systems are characterised by the existence 
of several minimal path sets for a specified scenario, 
e.g. several ways of energising a busbar. By nature, a 
minimal path sets analysis considers only two states 
per component: intact or, respectively, failed [2]. 
The fault tree analysis method corresponds with the 
determination of minimal cut sets: A minimal cut set 
is a combination of defective components, which 
causes the system to fail in the opposite sense of the 
specified scenario, e.g. “no single DC busbar ener-
gised”. Here, minimal means that a cut set consists 
of only as many defective components as causes the 
system to fail. Minimal cut sets comprise one (1st), 
two (2nd) or three (3rd order) defective components, 
and the probability of occurrence of a minimal cut 
set decreases rapidly with the number of components 
that belong to it. A redundant electrical system, in 
turn, is characterised by the fact that no 1st order 
minimal cut sets exist, apart from own defects of the 
busbar under consideration, but rather combinations 
of two or three defective components lead to the loss 
of voltage on busbar(s) and hence system failure. 
Furthermore, the minimal cut sets analysis differs 
from the minimal path sets analysis by the considera-
tion of all possible states of each component (intact, 
failure mode 1, failure mode 2, etc.). It is thus more 
complex and computationally more intensive than 
the minimal path sets analysis. The result, though, is 
equivalent to that of the established method of fault 
tree analysis, which is generally accepted as a verifi-
cation of system safety. The computationally less 
intensive minimal path sets analysis provides quicker 
available results, which are normally used as a first 
estimate of system safety in the design process. 
It must be noted that a model-based safety analysis 
only covers phenomena captured in the scope of 
modelled physics (section 2.1). Though the analysis 
is exhaustive to this extent, it is up to the designer to 
regard other possible threats, e.g. common causes 
such as humidity or electromagnetic interference. 
The key definitions regarding safety analysis based 
on minimal path and minimal cut sets are as follows. 
The common assumption of exponentially distrib-
uted lifetimes of the components ci means compo-
nent failure rates λi that are constant over lifetime. 
Thus, the probability of a component failure is 
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The probability of a minimal path set to occur is 
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The probability of system operation can be computed 
from m detected minimal path sets as 
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Likewise, the probability of system failure can be 
calculated from n detected minimal cut sets as 
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Generally, the relation between the probability of 
operation and failure, for a single component or a 
complex system is      tptp operationfailure 1 
Since the computation of system operation or failure 
probability from the above Poincaré formula can 
lead to a very large number of products, algorithms 
for sums of disjoint products [4] have been devel-
oped to reduce the size of the formula and to facili-
tate its numerical evaluation. 
An analysis example can be viewed in section 3.2. 
2.5.3 Reliability 
Whereas a safety analysis is focused on failure 
events that can be critical with respect to the safety 
of flight, reliability is concerned with the operational 
availability of a system or entire aircraft. Operational 
availability or dispatch reliability is a measure for the 
likelihood of an aircraft fulfilling its mission, that is 
for a commercial aircraft to make revenue flights on 
time with passengers and/or cargo. More precisely, 
the dispatch reliability is defined as the percentage of 
scheduled flights which depart without having a de-
lay of more than 15 minutes due to technical reasons, 
or a cancellation [1]. 
The commercial pressures have instigated the ability 
to continue to dispatch an aircraft with given system 
faults. Redundant design of aircraft on-board sys-
tems is adopted not only to fulfill the safety require-
ments, but also for reasons of dispatch reliability. In 
turn, this requires to examine the ability of a de-
graded system, when one or more failures have al-
ready occurred, to meet the safety requirements. 
ENADOT has an embedded function, developed in 
the Modelica language, for computing system opera-
tional availability. It is in essence a minimal path sets 
analysis, which uses information about allowed 
component deficiencies, so called MEL-items 
(Minimum Equipment List), entered by the operator. 
Let Csystem be the set of all system components ci , 
CMEL be the given set of nMEL possibly defective com-
ponents and k the number of intact components re-
quired,  and . Then, 
 minimal path sets are generated with 
the following properties: 
MELnk 
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Each minimal path set MP1, MP2, …, MPm contains 
those system components ci that are not an MEL-
item, i.e. not part of the set CMEL. 
Systemi Cc  \ MELC     MELiSystemii CcCcc   
As well, k intact components from the set of MEL-
items CMEL are included in each minimal path set. 
E.g. for k = 2 and nMEL = 3, the  following 
minimal path sets are composed: 
3
2
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System1 CMP  \   21MEL c,cC 
System2 CMP  \   31MEL c,cC 
System3 CMP  \   32MEL c,cC 
An analysis example is provided in section 3.3 for 
the electric power system introduced by section 3.1. 
2.5.4 Minimising the Computational Effort In-
volved with Safety Analysis 
Analysing the effect of combinations of intact and 
failed components on the occurrence of system func-
tion or failure can lead to an exponential growth of 
combinations to test. Regarding the detection of 
minimal path sets, 2n possible states would have to 
be evaluated for a system of n components, e.g. 220 > 
1106 for n = 20. 
To avoid the unfeasibility of automated analysis 
caused by an excessive amount of system states to 
test, strategies are developed to exclude inapplicable 
combinations of intact / failed components from the 
procedure. 
The minimal path sets analysis procedure of 
ENADOT draws on two kinds of information con-
tained in a system model. In a first step, the object 
structure of the system model, i.e. the arrangement of 
components and connections, is evaluated. Advan-
tage is taken of the fact that the structure of object-
oriented models is similar, although not exactly iden-
tical with minimal path sets. Regarding the object-
oriented model structure as a graph, an adapted 
depth-first search algorithm is used to find a moder-
ate number of candidates of minimal path sets. 
In a second step, the candidates are checked by simu-
lating the system model accordingly, to eventually 
extract the minimal path sets from the amount of 
candidates. This two-stage approach – depth-first 
search and then simulation – considerably reduces 
the overall computation effort, leading to a procedure 
that is viable even for systems of a size as shown in 
section 3.1. 
After the minimal path sets of a system have been 
determined for a given scenario, the probability 
measures are computed as described in section 2.5.2. 
For the minimal cut sets analysis, the theoretically 
possible number of system states is even higher: As-
suming that three states (intact, failure mode 1, fail-
ure mode 2) have to be considered for each compo-
nent of a system, this would lead to 3n possible sys-
tem states, e.g. 320 > 3109 for n = 20. 
Here, the strategy of minimising the amount of sys-
tem states to check includes at first to determine the 
minimal path sets, as described above. Then, mini-
mal cut sets are searched for according to heuristic 
rules that draw on the position of components in the 
system and their modes of failure. For instance, only 
combinations of failed components that belong to 
different minimal path sets or which are located ad-
jacent to a minimal path set, are checked. 
3 Modelling and Analysis Case Study 
This section illustrates the capabilities of ENADOT 
with respect to safety and reliability analysis by the 
example model of an aircraft on-board electric power 
system. Figure 5 shows the model, the basic structure 
and characteristics of which are oriented to the elec-
tric power system of the Airbus A380. The model 
complies with the typical configuration and func-
tionality of electrical systems of this aircraft cate-
gory, and it is thus adequate for a demonstration of 
the scope of ENADOT. The model has been devel-
oped based on a description, conceptual sketch and 
listing of the key electrical loads, which have been 
found in section 5.12.1 of reference [5]. It may differ 
in some minor respect from the actually built and 
flying electric system of the A380, yet, this does not 
affect the description of the scope of ENADOT. 
 
3.1 Electric Power System Modelling Example 
The schematic shown in Figure 5 is a direct snapshot 
of the electric power system model. It includes the 
following, salient components and features: 
 four engine driven 3-phase 115 VAC / 150 kVA 
Variable Frequency (VF) generators, identified 
as G1, G2, G3 and G4 
 two 3-phase 115 VAC / 120 kVA Constant Fre-
quency (CF) generators, driven by the Auxiliary 
Power Unit (APU), denoted as AG1 and AG2 
 a 70 kVA Ram Air Turbine (RAT) driven emer-
gency generator, named RatG 
 three 300 A Battery Charger Regulator Units 
(BCRU) – these are regulated Transformer Rec-
tifier Units (TRU) – named EssBCRU, BCRU1 
and BCRU2 
 a 300 A TRU identified as APU_TRU 
 four 28 VDC batteries, denoted as ESS_BAT, 
BAT1, BAT2 and APU_BAT 
 a static inverter, named INV, for emergency sup-
ply of the AC_EMER busbar 
3.1.1 System Functionality 
Figure 5 shows the normal in-flight operation of the 
electric power system. As can be seen, each engine 
driven generator G1 (blue), G2 (green), G3 (ma-
genta) and G4 (bronze) energises its associated bus-
bar AC_1, AC_2, AC_3 and AC_4. The two APU 
driven generators AG1 (purple) and AG2 (yellow) 
are available, but not engaged. If a generator fails, 
the neighboured generator will take over by closing 
the ACTC1 or ACTC5 contactor. If both generators 
on one side fail, then cross-transfer through the 
ACTC2, 3 and 4 contactors will sustain all AC bus-
bars energised, with yet decreased overall available 
power. Split generator operation is maintained in all 
cases since the engine driven AC generators are vari-
able frequency, each dependent on the speed of the 
related engine. 
The AC buses supply the non-essential cabin loads 
Galley1, 2, 3 and 4 and In-Flight Entertainment 
(IFE) 1 and 2. These form an intermittent load of up 
to 320 kVA (80 kVA per galley including cool-
ing) and 60 kVA (IFE). Those AC loads that are 
vital for the safe operation of the aircraft are con-
nected to the AC_ESS and AC_EMER busbars. 
These are airspeed probes and windshield heating, as 
well as motor driven hydraulic pumps and a set of 
Electro-Hydrostatic flight control Actuators (EHAs) 
needed to maintain a minimum acceptable level of 
airplane controllability. The AC essential loads sum 
up to 60 kVA. The AC_ESS and AC_EMER bus-
bars are supplied either by the AC_1 busbar (normal 
case) or, if AC_1 fails, from the AC_4 busbar. 
Should all engine generated power fail, then the 
RAT driven generator RatG can accept the 
AC_EssLoads and AC_EmerLoads. The latter can 
also be powered by battery through the static inverter 
INV, e.g. during RAT transit. 
Other than the AC part of the electric power system, 
the 28 VDC part offers a no-break power capability 
even during changes of system status, which is cru-
cial to the functioning of vital control systems, such 
as engine and flight control computers, avionics sys-
tems, flight deck instruments and radio communica-
tion. These loads are represented in the model by 
DC_EssLoads, DC1_Loads and DC2_Loads and 
account for 4 kW altogether. The cabin lights make 
up 15 kW of power, supplied by the non-essential 
part of the DC system. 
3.1.2 Degraded System Operation 
Figure 6 shows the electric power system in a con-
ceivable mode of degraded operation. The failed 
components Engine1, G2, APU and BCRU2 are 
marked in red colour. Since the power supply from 
G1 and G2 is lost, the AC_1, AC_2, AC_3, DC_1 
and DC_2 busbars are energised by G3 (magenta). 
Failure of the BCRU2 has been recovered by closing 
the DCTC2 contactor. The other remaining generator 
G4 (bronze) energises the AC_4, as well as the es-
sential busbars AC_ESS, AC_EMER and DC_ESS. 
As the scheme also shows, half of the cabin loads – 
galleys, IFE and lights – have been suspended, 
whereas the essential loads remain fully satisfied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Electric network model of a recent four-engine long range aircraft, scheme shows normal operation in flight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Electric network model of a recent four-engine long range aircraft, scheme shows degraded operation in 
flight after Engine1, Generator2, APU and BCRU2 failure 
3.2 Safety Analysis Example Result 
This section shows the result of a safety analysis 
conducted for the supply to the AC_1 busbar of the 
introduced electric system. This non-essential busbar 
has been selected to serve as an example, since the 
result is relatively compact. 
Figures 7 to 12 show the six determined minimal 
path sets. They are depicted graphically and directly 
in the model diagram, after completion of the analy-
sis procedure. Components belonging to a minimal 
path set appear in the colour of the connected gen-
erator, failed components in grey. In normal opera-
tion, AC_1 is supplied by generator G1 (Figure 7), 
which can be transferred to another engine or APU 
driven generator in abnormal operating cases. Hence, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Minimal path set 1 - AC_1 busbar energised by G1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Minimal path set 2 - AC_1 supplied by G2 across AC_2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Minimal path set 3 - AC_1 fed by G3 through AC_3 and AC_2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AC_1 has multiple redundancy as to voltage sources. 
The minimal path sets analysis accounts for the con-
nections of components, their potential faults and 
network reconfiguration logics. The result, e.g. the 
six minimal path sets found for the AC_1 busbar, is 
thus also a check of the correct functioning of the 
system and its implementation as a model. 
As explained, two states are considered for each 
component, intact or failed, in the minimal path sets 
analysis. Many components yet have two or more 
failure modes. Amongst others, the following are 
realised in the modelling: “open circuit” and “short 
circuit” for a cable or a busbar, “open circuit” and 
“fails to open” for a contactor, “loss of output volt-
age” for a generator. The minimal cut sets analysis 
accounts for every failure mode of all components 
and the resulting effects on the electric network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Minimal path set 4 - AC_1 energised by G4 across AC_4, AC_3 und AC_2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Minimal path set 5 - AC_1 fed by AG1 through AC_2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Minimal path set 6 - AC_1 supplied by AG2 across AC_2 
A total of 5 first order and 21 second order minimal 
cut sets were identified by the analysis procedure and 
are listed in Table 1. Figures 13 to 19 show typical 
cases for the scenario “loss of voltage on AC_1”. 
Besides own possible faults of the AC_1 busbar – 
open circuit (Figure 15) or short circuit – other single 
component faults exist that lead to a loss of voltage 
on AC_1: e.g. a short circuit of cable Feeder1 (Fig-
ure 14), which is directly connected to the busbar, or 
in the same manner a short circuit of cable AEss-
Feed1 (Figure13). Typical examples of 2nd order 
minimal cut sets are a failure of a component that 
feeds AC_1 in normal system operation, in combina-
tion with another component failure that prevents 
cross-transfer through AC_2 and ACTC1. Examples 
can be viewed in Figures 16 and 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, a stuck closed contactor in combination 
with a generator fault (Figure 17) or in combination 
with a short circuit (Figure 19) can cause a loss of 
voltage on the AC_1 busbar, the probability of which 
has been computed for a duration of t = 1 Fh (flight 
hour) as 4.010-4. 
The failure of AC_1 is dominated by faults of the 
connected cables. If necessary, this situation can be 
improved by introducing contactors with current 
limitation between the cables and the busbar, which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
prevent the propagation of the effects of short cir-
cuits. 
For most of the single component faults, this would 
avoid the effect of losing voltage on the AC_1 bus-
bar. Since there is multiple redundancy in terms of 
voltage sources, a decrease of the probability of loss 
of voltage on AC_1 is then limited only by possible 
own defects of the busbar. 
 
 
Figure 13: Minimal cut set 1-2: short 
circuit of cable leads to loss of voltage 
on AC_1 busbar 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Minimal cut set 1-3: cable 
short circuit causes failure of AC_1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Minimal cut set 1-5: open 
circuit leads to loss of AC_1 
 
 
Figure 16: Minimal cut set 2-7: G1 
fault and open contactor cause AC_1 
failure 
 
 
Figure 17: Minimal cut set 2-14: G1 
fault and stuck closed contactor lead to 
loss of AC_1 
 
 
Figure 18: Minimal cut set 2-5: 
open contactor and shorted cable 
lead to AC_1 failure 
 
 
Figure 19: Minimal cut set 2-21: short 
circuit of AC_2 and stuck contactor 
cause loss of AC_1 
MP2 = CSystem \ CMEL {G1, G2, G3, (APU&AG1)} 1st order minimal cut sets: 
 
… 1-1 Feeder1 O/C 0.0002 
1-2 AEssFeed1 S/C 0.0001 
1-3 Feeder1 S/C 0.0001 
1-4 AC_1 S/C 210-7 
1-5 AC_1 O/C 110-7 
MP15 = CSystem \ CMEL  {G3, G4, (APU&AG1), (APU&AG2)} 
leading to a dispatch reliability of 0.929 for 200 Fh. 
As obvious, allowing system deficiences for dispatch 
improves the reliability. This is however limited by 
the failure probabilities of components that are al-
ways required to be intact for dispatch. Also, the de-
graded system must have sufficient safety margin. 
 
2nd order minimal cut sets: 
 
2-1 G1 loss Feeder2 O/C 810-9
2-2 G1 loss Feeder2 S/C 410-9
2-3 GC1 O/C Feeder2 O/C 210-9
2-4 Engine1 loss Feeder2 O/C 210-9
2-5 GC1 O/C Feeder2 S/C 110-9
2-6 Engine1 loss Feeder2 S/C 110-9
2-7 G1 loss ACTC1 O/C 410-10
2-8 GC1 O/C ACTC1 O/C 110-10
2-9 Engine1 loss ACTC1 O/C 110-10
2-10 AEssC1 s.c. AEssFeed3 S/C 110-11
2-11 ACTC1 s.c. Feeder2 S/C 110-11
2-12 G1 loss AC_2 S/C 810-12
2-13 G1 loss AC_2 O/C 410-12
2-14 G1 loss GC1 s.c. 410-12
2-15 GC1 O/C AC_2 S/C 210-12
2-16 Engine1 loss AC_2 S/C 210-12
2-17 GC1 O/C AC_2 O/C 110-12
2-18 Engine1 loss AC_2 O/C 110-12
2-19 Engine1 loss GC1 s.c. 110-12
2-20 AC_ESS S/C AEssC1 s.c. 210-14
2-21 AC_2 S/C ACTC1 s.c. 210-14
 
4 Conclusion 
This paper outlined the capabilities of the Modelica 
based modelling and analysis tool ENADOT regard-
ing concept design and optimisation of aircraft on-
board electric power systems, which have recently 
gained in relevance, installed power and criticality. 
In addition to means for the dimensioning of electric 
network components regarding power and weight, 
the system safety and operational reliability can be 
evaluated in terms of an automated minimal path sets 
and minimal cut sets analysis. 
Future work will be oriented to a transfer of the 
analysis methods to other physical domains. 
 
Table 1: List of minimal cut sets sorted by probability, 
for loss of voltage on AC_1 busbar, t = 1 Fh  
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This section shows the result of a dispatch reliability 
analysis conducted for the introduced electric power 
system, see Figure 5. The following set of nMEL = 6 
allowed component deficiencies (MEL-items) is as-
sumed: CMEL = {G1, G2, G3, G4, (APU & AG1), 
(APU & AG2)} i.e. six generators two of which in 
combination with the auxiliary power unit. For k = 6 
required intact components, i.e. no allowed defi-
ciences, the analysis determines one minimal path set 
MP1 = CSystem which includes all system components. 
With given component failure rates λi (not listed due 
to extensiveness) and a duration of t = 200 Fh for 10 
consecutive days of flying without maintenance, a 
dispatch reliability of 0.869 is computed. 
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